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Comment
INTERPRETING EMOLUMENTS TODAY:
THE FRAMERS’ INTENT AND THE “PRESENT” PROBLEM
BIANCA SPINOSA ∗
“The $200 million hotel inside the federally owned Old Post Office building has become the place to see, be seen, drink, network—even live—for the still-emerging Trump set. It’s a rich environment for lobbyists and anyone hoping to rub elbows with
Trump-related politicos . . . .” 1
Two provisions of the United States Constitution, the Foreign and
Domestic Emoluments Clauses (“the Clauses”) historically received very
little attention, but for the first time, they are being interpreted in federal
court. Three separate lawsuits allege President Donald Trump’s business
interests are violating these Clauses. 2 These business interests stem from
President Trump’s role as a well-known global businessperson and founder
of the Trump Organization before becoming President. 3 The Trump Organization has ten hotels in its real estate portfolio. 4 One of these hotels, the
Trump International Hotel (“Trump Hotel”), is located in the Old Post Office Building within a mile of the White House. 5 The Old Post Office
Building has been on the National Register of Historic Places since 19736
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1. Julie Bykowicz, Donald Trump’s Hotel May Be Political Capital of the Nation’s Capital,
BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/03/05/donaldtrump-hotel-may-political-capital-nation-capital/4qXAB8GFkMRkl0w9aIYRcL/story.html.
2. See infra Section I.D.
3. See Donald J. Trump: Founder, The Trump Organization, TRUMP ORG.,
https://www.trump.com/leadership/donald-j-trump-biography (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
4. The Trump Story, TRUMP ORG., https://www.trump.com/hotels (last visited Apr. 17,
2019).
5. Bykowicz, supra note 1.
6. Old Post Office, Washington, D.C., GSA, https://www.gsa.gov/historic-buildings/oldpost-office-washington-dc (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). The Old Post Office Building was built
from 1892 to 1899 and originally housed the headquarters of the U.S. Post Office Department. Id.
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and, like other historic properties the General Services Administration
(“GSA”) maintains, can be rented. 7 In 2013, the GSA leased the Old Post
Office Building to Mr. Trump. 8
In January 2017, President-Elect Trump’s personal attorneys announced Mr. Trump would turn over management of the Trump Organization’s “investment and business assets” to a trust in order to avoid conflicts
of interest. 9 According to a Morgan Lewis White Paper, President-Elect
Trump planned to put all his Trump Organization investment and business
assets into a trust his sons, Donald J. Trump, Jr. and Eric Trump, would
manage. 10 After the inauguration, President Trump’s lawyers informed the
GSA he had placed his interest in the Old Post Office Building into a trust
and was not managing that interest any longer. 11 In March 2017, the GSA
determined President Trump was complying with the lease of the Old Post
Office Building. 12 According to an Office of Inspector General report on
the GSA, however, the agency did not give enough attention to constitutional issues raised about whether President Trump’s interests in the Old
Post Office Building ran afoul of the Emoluments Clauses. 13
Mr. Trump amassed a larger-than-life business and reputation before
he became President, but does his interest in the Trump Hotel through the
Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust (“the Trust”) 14 amount to violations of
the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses? The press have widely reported that foreign government officials stay at the luxury Hotel while in

The building is situated on a city block in the “Federal Triangle” area of the city along Pennsylvania Avenue. Id.
7. Renting GSA Property, GSA, https://www.gsa.gov/real-estate/gsa-properties/renting-gsaproperty (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
8. See Jessica Taylor & Peter Overby, Federal Watchdog Finds Government Ignored Emol(Jan.
16,
2019),
uments
Clause
with
Trump
Hotel,
NPR
https://www.npr.org/2019/01/16/685977471/federal-watchdog-finds-government-ignoredemoluments-clause-with-trump-hotel; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN.,
EVALUATION OF GSA’S MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE OLD POST OFFICE
BUILDING LEASE 2
(2019), https://www.gsaig.gov/sites/default/files/ipa-reports/JE19002%20OIG%20EVALUATION%20REPORTGSA%27s%20Management%20%26%20Administration%20of%20OPO%20Building%20Lease_
January%2016%202019_Redacted.pdf. “Donald J. Trump” and the “Trump Old Post Office
Member Corp.,” a Delaware corporation Trump wholly owned, was the tenant. Id.
9. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE PRESIDENT 1, 2
(2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3400512/Morgan-Lewis-Trump-Trust-WhitePaper.pdf [hereinafter MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER].
10. Id. at 2.
11. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 8, at 8.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Id. at 5.
14. MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 2; Answer of the President in His Official Capacity at 8, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018), 315 F.
Supp. 3d 875 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM).
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Washington, D.C. 15 The Attorneys General in Maryland and Washington,
D.C. filed a lawsuit against President Trump, in his official capacity, alleging violations of the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clause. 16 According to the lawsuit, foreign government officials said they chose to stay at
the Trump Hotel because it is associated with the President. 17 Maryland
and Washington, D.C. Attorneys General provided a laundry list of the alleged violations involving the Trump Hotel in their Amended Complaint in
District of Columbia v. Trump, 18 including an event the Embassy of Kuwait
hosted, a “National Day celebration,” at the Trump Hotel on February 22,
2017. 19 The Embassy of Kuwait allegedly paid from $40,000 to $60,000 in
connection with the celebration at the Trump Hotel. 20
While President Trump officially transferred management interests of
the Trump Organization to the Trust in January 2017, 21 the President remained informed about at least some of the Trump Organization’s business
activities through the Trust. 22 Before taking office, Mr. Trump stated the
Trump Organization would donate all profits earned from foreign governments to the U.S. Treasury Department. 23 On February 25, 2019, the
Trump Organization announced it had donated nearly $200,000 to the U.S.
Treasury in order not to retain profits from foreign governments using its
properties. 24 In addition, the Trump Organization agreed not to make any

15. District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 734 (D. Md. 2018) (citing Amended
Complaint at 14–16, Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM)); Bykowicz, supra
note 1; Julia Harte, Kuwait Could Pay up to $60,000 for Party at Trump Hotel in Washington,
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-hotel-idUSKBN1640LE;
Jackie Northam, Kuwait Celebration at Trump Hotel Raises Conflict of Interest Questions, NPR
(Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/25/517039323/kuwait-celebrationat-trump-hotel-raises-conflict-of-interest-questions.
16. Amended Complaint at 2, Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM).
17. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 734 (citing Amended Complaint, supra note 16).
18. 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018).
19. Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 15.
20. Id.
21. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
22. See Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 733–34; Answer of the President, supra note 14, at 17.
According to the Answer, President Trump receives information about the Trust’s assets limited to
“total profit or loss.” Answer of the President, supra note 14, at 17. The Trust “directly or indirectly owns all of the President’s investment and business assets,” the trustees control the trust
assets and distribution, and “the President is the beneficiary of the Trust.” Id. at 16.
23. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 733.
24. Bernard Condon, Trump Org Donates Nearly $200K to Cover Foreign Profits,
PRESS
(Feb.
25,
2019),
ASSOCIATED
https://www.apnews.com/a4349ac80a7048bdb61f017fffd9623f. “The Trump Organization said a
check for $191,538 sent to Treasury represents profits from embassy parties, hotel stays and other
foreign government spending at its Washington Hotel and other properties . . . .” Id.
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foreign business deals while he was in office. 25 But are these efforts
enough?
Ethics experts from both President Barack Obama’s and President
George W. Bush’s administrations have called on the President to do more
than put his business interests and assets in a trust his sons control. 26 According to Norman L. Eisen, the chair of the government watchdog group
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) 27 and the
White House Special Counsel for Ethics and Government Reform under
President Obama; Richard W. Painter, the Associate Counsel to President
G.W. Bush and chief ethics lawyer; and Laurence H. Tribe, a Constitutional
Law professor at Harvard University, “Never in American history has a
president . . . presented more conflict of interest questions and foreign entanglements than Donald Trump.” 28
President Trump’s business practices and the Trust formation drew attention to the Emoluments Clauses and led to ongoing litigation regarding
potential violations of those Clauses. 29 This Comment will contribute to the
ongoing conversation regarding the meaning and reach of the Emoluments
Clauses 30 by asking the question: What theory or theories of constitutional
interpretation should courts use to interpret the meaning of the Foreign and
Domestic Emoluments Clauses? Rather than take a position on whether
President Trump is violating the Emoluments Clauses, this Comment will
analyze the courts’ reasoning and explore how different theories of constitutional interpretation have and could apply to the Emoluments Clause provisions of the Constitution. This Comment will analyze how courts in the
emoluments litigation adopted an originalist and purposive approach to interpreting the provisions, focusing on what the Emoluments Clauses meant
at the time of the Founding. 31
25. Id.; see MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 2, 3 (describing how the Trump
Organization would not be making any new deals, the Trust Agreement does not allow any new
foreign deals while Mr. Trump is President, and the Trust and the Trump Organization will not
“engag[e] in any new deals with respect to the use of the ‘Trump’ brand . . . associated with the
Trump Organization or Donald J. Trump in any foreign jurisdictions”).
26. NORMAN L. EISEN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: ITS TEXT,
MEANING,
AND
APPLICATION
TO
DONALD
J.
TRUMP
1
(2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-emoluments-clause-its-text-meaning-and-application-todonald-j-trump/. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
27. Eisen’s watchdog group, CREW, is a plaintiff in the Emoluments Clause case in New
York. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 180
(S.D.N.Y. 2017).
28. EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1.
29. See infra Section I.D.
30. See Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 30,
34 (2012) (arguing that when the Framers included the Foreign Emoluments Clause in the Constitution they were distancing themselves from European diplomatic culture to avoid corruption); see
also infra note 49 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Sections II.A.1, II.A.4.
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This Comment will also argue that courts can reach the same result of
finding that the plaintiffs have plausibly stated a claim of an Emoluments
Clause violation by applying the Clauses’ anti-corruption purpose 32 to the
world we live in today through a living approach to constitutional interpretation. 33 While many of the Justices on the Supreme Court are originalists,
the National Law Journal reported Justice Kagan said some Justices think
“‘original understanding’ is the ‘alpha and omega of every constitutional
question,’ . . . but ‘there are other people on this bench who do not.’” 34 Finally, this Comment will analyze how an abstract, anti-corruption principle
embedded in the Clauses can result in a living, moral reading of the provisions. 35 This Comment will show how courts need not be confined to one
theory of constitutional interpretation to reach the same conclusion that the
Emoluments Clauses are provisions that guard against corruption and undue
foreign influence. In support of this argument, this Comment will examine
the text of the Constitution’s Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses,
the history and purpose of the Clauses, early cases involving emoluments,
executive branch precedent, and the recent litigation.36
I. BACKGROUND
Until President Trump, no President or other high-level U.S. official
had faced a violation of the Foreign or Domestic Emoluments Clauses. 37
Meaning, no federal judge has needed to interpret the meaning of the word
emoluments, which is undefined in the Clauses. 38 Professor John Mikhail
of the Georgetown University Law Center said, “[I]t comes as a surprise to
many people that there are terms in the Constitution . . . that . . . have never

32. See Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The Clause was intended by the Framers to guard against corruption and foreign influence.”); District of Columbia
v. Trump, 315. F. Supp. 3d 875, 896 (D. Md. 2018) (finding the historical record reflects an “intention that the Emoluments Clauses function as broad anti-corruption provisions.”); Citizens for
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 188 (finding that based on the history, “there
can be no doubt” the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s purpose “was to prevent official corruption
and foreign influence”); see also EISEN ET AL., supra note 26; Deborah Samuel Sills, The Foreign
Emoluments Clause: Protecting Our National Security Interests, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 73 (2018);
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 353 (2009); infra
Section II.A.
33. See infra Section II.B.
34. Marcia Coyle, Justice Kagan Throws Shade on Her Originalist Colleagues, NAT’L L.J.
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/12/06/justice-kagan-throws-shadeon-her-originalist-colleagues/?slreturn=20181126140203.
35. See infra Section II.C.
36. See infra Section I.A–D.
37. Peter Overby, Federal Lawsuit Against President Trump’s Business Interests Allowed to
Proceed, NPR (July 25, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/25/632300960/federal-lawsuitagainst-president-trumps-business-interests-allowed-to-proceed.
38. Id.
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been authoritatively adjudicated.” 39 In the absence of a body of constitutional law on the Clauses, courts have looked to the text of the Constitution
and Founding-era dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of the word emoluments. 40
The plain language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause is found in Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution. It provides:
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall,
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any
King, Prince, or foreign State. 41
The plain language of the Domestic Emoluments Clause, found in Article
II, Section 1, Clause 7, provides:
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished
during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he
shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from
the United States, or any of them. 42
While the meaning of some words in the Clauses such as, present, Office,
Title, and Compensation are fairly straightforward, the meaning of the word
emoluments is less clear. 43
Section I.A will evaluate the plain language and purpose of the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses and review the history of their inclusion in the Constitution. 44 Because emoluments is an archaic word, the
word’s meaning is open to interpretation and at the heart of the disputes.
The plaintiffs in the recent emoluments litigation argue emoluments has a
broad meaning encompassing any profit, gain, or advantage. 45 President
Trump argues emolument has a narrow, office-related definition—
something that is accepted in exchange for performing a service or favor. 46
Section I.B will discuss early cases involving emoluments, and Section I.C.
will analyze executive branch precedent wherein the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) has construed the Clauses broadly as anti-corruption provisions. 47 Section I.D. will describe the three pieces of litigation involving

39. Id.
40. See infra Section I.D.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
43. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 886 (D. Md. 2018) (interpreting the
definition of an emolument after both parties offered different textual interpretations of the word).
44. See infra Section I.A.
45. See infra note 214–216 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 218–221 and accompanying text.
47. See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
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the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses working their way through
federal courts, and the different outcomes of the cases. 48
A. Gold Snuff Boxes and Diamond-Encrusted Portraits: The Text and
Historical Context of the Emoluments Clauses
Many scholars agree that historical evidence at the time of the Founding indicates, at least to some degree, the motivation for adding the Foreign
Emoluments Clause to the Constitution was to avoid corrupting influences. 49 Even before the separate states unified under the U.S. Constitution,
a clause in Article VI of the Articles of Confederation of 1781 contained
language about restrictions on U.S. officers accepting a present, gift, or
emolument from a foreign entity:
No state without the Consent of the united states, in congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy
from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty
with any King, prince or state; nor shall any person holding any
office of profit or trust under the united states, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince or foreign state; nor shall the united
states in congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of
nobility. 50
During the Federal Convention of 1787, James Madison wrote that
South Carolina Delegate Charles Pinckney “urged the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers [and] other officers of the U.S. independent of external influence.” 51 According to Madison, Delegate Pinckney suggested inserting a clause with the following language: “No person holding any office
of profit or trust under the U.S. shall without the consent of the Legislature,
accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever, from

48. See infra Section I.D.
49. See Teachout, supra note 30, at 30 (discussing how the Founders were wary of officers
accepting gifts because they could “influence” the officer); see also Sills, supra note 32, at 74 (describing how the Framers did not want officials to “be persuaded, either consciously or subconsciously, to alter their decisions to benefit foreign powers”); EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 4–5
(describing how the Foreign Emoluments Clause was not meant to apply only to diplomats and
was meant to be “a broader anti-corruption measure.”); Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public
Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW L.
REV. COLLOQUY 180, 180 (2013) (agreeing with Professor Teachout that the purpose of the Foreign Emoluments Clause was to prevent corruption). But see Amandeep S. Grewal, The Purposes
of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 167, 168 (2017) (discussing how historical
materials from the founding era indicate that the Framers intended the Foreign Emoluments
Clause to “prevent corruption,” but cautions against taking a broad purposive approach to interpretation).
50. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1.
51. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 389 (Max Ferrand ed.,
1911).
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any King, Prince[,] or foreign State.” 52 The provision passed “nem: contrad.” 53
According to Professor Zephyr Teachout’s article, Gifts, Office, and
Corruption, the Founders were following the mold of a rule made in the
Dutch Republic in 1651, more than 100 years before the adoption of the
U.S. Constitution. 54 The rule banned Dutch foreign ministers from receiving “any presents, directly or indirectly, in any manner or way whatever.”55
The Dutch rule was considered somewhat “radical” by the day’s standards,
as gifts from foreign governments were a typical part of diplomacy. 56 As
an example of the European tradition in diplomacy, a letter from Benjamin
Franklin’s grandson, William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson in
1790, described the European custom of gift giving when an Ambassador or
other public Minister left a court. 57 The European country would give the
diplomat a present according to how highly they were respected, or to show
respect to their sovereign nation, and sometimes a present was given due to
the importance of the business for which the diplomat had visited. 58 William Temple Franklin wrote these presents consisted of “[j]ewels, [p]late,
[t]apestry, [p]orcelain, and sometimes money.” 59 A foreign government’s
personal respect for a diplomat or the importance of the negotiations could
impact the gift the foreign government gave the diplomat. 60 For example,
Franklin wrote that his grandfather, whom King Louis XVI of France highly respected, received a gold snuff box from the King enameled with “a
large miniature of the King set with four hundred and eight [d]iamonds of a
beautiful water, forming a wreath round the picture and a [c]rown on the
top.” 61

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Teachout, supra note 30, at 34; see also EISEN ET AL, supra note 26, at 4 (citing
Teachout, supra note 32, at 353).
55. Teachout, supra note 30, at 34 (quoting 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 651 (1906)).
56. Id.
57. Letter from William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 27, 1790),
https://www.loc.gov/resource/mtj1.012_0397_0400/?sp=1. Teachout cites this letter in her account of the Emoluments Clauses’ history. See Teachout, supra note 30, at 35.
58. Letter from William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 57; Teachout,
supra note 30, at 35 (describing a similar incident involving King Louis XVI of France’s habit of
giving jeweled snuff boxes to diplomats, including giving one such box to Arthur Lee, who wrote
that he was worried accepting “might excite some murmurs’” (quoting 2 RICHARD HENRY LEE,
LIFE OF ARTHUR LEE 143 (Boston, Wells, & Lilly 1829)).
59. Letter from William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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During the constitutional ratification debates in Virginia, Governor
Edmund Randolph said the Clause was added to “prevent corruption.” 62
Randolph explained that people “have a natural inherent right of receiving
emoluments from anyone, unless they be restrained by the regulations of
the community.” 63 Randolph did not define emoluments. 64 However, he
described an “accident” that contributed to producing the restriction, where
“[a] box was presented to our ambassador by the king of our allies.” 65 This
is likely referring to the bejeweled snuff box given to Benjamin Franklin. 66
“It was thought proper,” Randolph explained, “in order to exclude corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiving or
holding any emoluments from foreign states.” 67 Randolph was illustrating
the King of France’s gift of a gold snuff box to Franklin had the potential to
corrupt during a time when “we were in harmony with the king of
France.” 68 Randolph went on to say, “if, at that moment . . . we had supposed that he was corrupting our ambassador, it might have disturbed that
confidence, and diminished that mutual friendship, which contributed to
carry us through the [Revolutionary] war.” 69 Governor Randolph was worried not only about the actual impact receiving the gold snuff box would
have on Ambassador Franklin, but also about the impact receiving the gold
snuff box without the permission of Congress could project to others who
“had supposed” the gift was corrupting. 70
As further indication the Framers were concerned about the potential
of undue foreign influence, the Framers debated in the 1787 Convention
about where to vest the power to declare war and sign treaties with other nations. 71 Some members wanted the President alone to possess the power to
make treaties, since they thought the President “would not dare” to make a
treaty that was not in the best interest of the country and “from his situation
he was more interested in making a good treaty than any other man in the

62. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 465–66 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co.
1836).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 465.
66. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
67. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 62, at 465.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 465–66.
70. Id. at 465; see EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 7.
71. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 263–65 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1881).
The Treaty Clause of the Constitution says the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” U.S. CONST. Art II, § 2, cl. 2.
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United States.” 72 Delegate Pinckney, however, was wary of giving the
President the sole power to make a treaty. 73 He thought a President could
be more susceptible to “foreign bribery and corruption” than a King, because unlike a monarch, “[the President’s] office is not to be permanent, but
temporary; and he might receive a bribe which would enable him to live in
greater splendor in another country than his own.” 74 The Framers eventually agreed to give the President the power to propose treaties because the
President is the “head of the Union, and to vest the Senate . . . with the
power of agreeing or disagreeing to the terms proposed.” 75
The Framers were also concerned about the potential for undue influence and pressures from within the different branches of government. 76 In
the Federalist, Alexander Hamilton wrote that without careful consideration
to the President’s salary, “the separation of the executive from the legislative [branch] would be merely nominal and nugatory.” 77 Hamilton explained that if the legislature had discretion over the “salary and emoluments” of the President, they “could render him as obsequious to their will
as they might think proper to make him.” 78 They could either hold back
salary and emoluments or “tempt” the President with extreme generosity
“to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations.” 79
Hamilton thought the President should receive a set salary that would
not change during their term. 80 Hamilton also wrote, “neither the Union nor
any of its members” would be allowed to give the President “any other
emolument,” nor would the President be allowed to receive an emolument
other than a set salary. 81 Hamilton’s writings on the President’s compensation in the Federalist mirrors the language of the Domestic Emoluments
Clause of the Constitution, which provides that the President “shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or
any of [the States].” 82 Hamilton’s idea was that a set salary, with no other
government benefits, would make it less likely for other branches of government, or the states, to exert control over the president because “[t]hey
can neither weaken his fortitude by operating on his necessities nor corrupt

72. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 71, at 264.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 265.
76. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Colonial Press rev. ed. 1901)
(discussing the provision for the support of the executive branch).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 404.
81. Id.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II., § 1, cl. 7.
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his integrity by appealing to his avarice.”83 To further this purpose and ensure the President received a set salary, the Domestic Emoluments Clause
provides: “The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the
Period for which he shall have been elected . . . .” 84 The Framers were concerned about potentially corrupting forces of undue influence, both at
home 85 and abroad. 86
B. Early Cases Involving Emoluments Issues
Some early cases shed a light on how courts have interpreted the
meaning of the word emoluments in the context of federal officers, but not
in the specific context of the Emoluments Clauses.87 In Hoyt v. United
States, 88 a customs collector owed more than $200,000 to the U.S. Treasury. 89 A 1799 Treasury Act 90 stated that customs collectors’ duties included receiving all money paid for duties and taking all bonds for securing the
payments. 91 An Act of 1822 92 gave collectors “compensation in addition to
fees and emoluments.” 93 The United States Supreme Court explained that
the Act of 1822 “limits the emoluments of an office.” 94 Hoyt defined emoluments in the context of the statute narrowly: “What is an emolument? It is
a compensation for the performance of an official duty.” 95 The Court referenced an 1839 statute 96 making appropriations for civil and diplomatic government expenses as providing that “no officer . . . whose salaries, or whose
pay or emoluments, is or are fixed by law and regulations, shall receive any
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (rev. ed. 1901).
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
85. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
87. See United States v. MacMillan, 253 U.S. 195, 205 (1920) (discussing whether, under a
statute, a sum a clerk collected for his services was a fee or emolument); McLean v. United States,
226 U.S. 374, 383 (1912) (discussing how emoluments under a statute is the perquisites of office);
Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. 109, 131 (1850) (discussing how the meaning of emoluments in the
context of an early 1800s statute is compensation for an officer’s performance of a duty). The
Department of Justice representing President Trump in the emoluments litigation references these
cases in support of their argument that emoluments has a narrow, office-related meaning. District
of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 890 (D. Md. 2018); see also Sills, supra note 32, at
92 (describing how the word emoluments was narrowly interpreted in Hoyt in the context of a
statute, not an emoluments constitutional provision).
88. 51 U.S. 109 (1850).
89. Id. at 132.
90. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 21, 1 Stat. 627, 642.
91. Id.
92. Act of May 7, 1822, ch. 62, § 8, 3 Stat. 684, 684.
93. Hoyt, 51 U.S. at 131; § 8, 3 Stat. at 684.
94. Hoyt, 51 U.S. at 131.
95. Id.
96. Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 82, § 3, 5 Stat. 339, 349.
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extra allowance, or compensation, in any form whatever.” 97 The Court in
Hoyt held these Acts were a “system of legislation” against public officers’
claims for extra compensation and “effectively extinguish[ed] them” except
under Congress’ authority.” 98
In United States v. MacMillan, 99 the Court considered whether a clerk
for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
owed interest on the average daily balances of a bank account.100 The bank
account consisted of the “fees and emoluments of [the clerk’s] office” and
money litigants gave the clerk for court costs. 101 The government alleged
that the interest on the bank account was “a fee or emolument of the office
of the clerk,” and he should have accounted for it as public money of the
United States. 102 The Court, however, held the fees and emoluments the
clerk collected and deposited into the bank was not money or property belonging to the United States, 103 and the interest on the sum of the fees and
emoluments was not an emolument because of “the individual character of
the bank deposit.” 104 The Court cited United States v. Hill 105 in determining
that in this context, “a fee or emolument” is money a clerk received “for a
service . . . pertaining to their office” or for “official services.” 106
In McLean v. United States, 107 Major McLean served in the Adjutant
General’s department from 1875 until he died in 1884. 108 He was not paid
during the eleven years between his resignation in 1864 and his reinstatement in 1875. 109 The Auditor of the War Department gave McLean’s widow the “pay and personal subsistence” the government owed her husband,
but did not give the widow forage for her two horses and servants’ pay. 110
The Court held the government owed McLean’s widow the back pay and
emoluments that the government would have paid her late husband. 111 The
Court explained the statute required accounting officers to pay all back pay
and emoluments that would have been payable to her husband because the
words “embrace all the compensation, perquisites and dues to which he was
97. Hoyt, 51 U.S. at 141.
98. Id. at 142.
99. 253 U.S. 195 (1920).
100. Id. at 199.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 204.
104. Id. at 204–05.
105. 120 U.S. 169 (1887).
106. United States v. MacMillan, 253 U.S. 195, 205 (1920) (citing United States v. Hill, 120
U.S. 169 (1887)).
107. 226 U.S. 374 (1912).
108. Id. at 377.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 377–78.
111. Id. at 381.
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entitled as an officer,” including the widow’s claim for the forage for horses
and servants’ pay. 112 The Court found the words of the statute did not make
a distinction between pay and emoluments. 113 The Court explained the
word emoluments was the most adequate word that could have been used
because “[i]t especially expresses the perquisites of an office.” 114
In Hoyt, MacMillan, and McLean—cases that involved federal officials—the Supreme Court defined emoluments as the fees, dues, and compensation an officer received through performing their official duties. 115
For example, interest on fees and emoluments was not deemed to be an
emolument of office in MacMillan because of the “individual character of
the bank deposit,” 116 so the Court differentiated between services that were
performed pertaining to a clerk’s office and services that were not. While
shedding some light on how the Supreme Court has interpreted the word
emoluments, the Court, in these three cases, was not interpreting emoluments in the context of the emoluments constitutional provisions. 117
C. Executive Branch Precedent and the Emoluments Clauses
Executive branch practice and precedent has interpreted the Emoluments Clauses as it relates to the Office of the President for more than a
hundred years. 118 Every President since George Washington has turned to
the Attorney General for “legal advice regarding a proposed action or policy.” 119 The Attorney General interprets law within the Executive
Branch. 120 The Attorney General delegates to the Office of Legal Counsel
(“OLC”) the task of giving legal advice to the President and all executive
branch agencies. 121
As far back as 1902, the Acting U.S. Attorney General at the time,
Henry M. Hoyt, contemplated the purpose of the Foreign Emoluments
Clause, stating its language “has been viewed as particularly directed
against every kind of influence by foreign governments upon officers of the

112. Id. at 379, 381.
113. Id. at 381–82.
114. Id. at 383.
115. See supra notes 94–95, 103, 112–114.
116. United States v. MacMillan, 253 U.S. 195, 204–05 (1920).
117. See Sills, supra note 32, at 92.
118. See infra notes 122–127.
119. See Arthur H. Garrison, The Opinions by the Attorney General and the Office of Legal
Counsel: How and Why They Are Significant, 76 ALB. L. REV. 217, 220, 235–36 (2013) (discussing how the OLC provides legal advice to the President and solves disputes over legal questions
within the Executive Branch).
120. Id. at 244.
121. Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/olc (last visited
Sept. 18, 2018).
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United States, based on our historic policies as a nation.” 122 Hoyt found a
gift from Prince Henry of Prussia would not be allowed without Congress’s
permission, even though he was not a reigning prince, because the Prince
could potentially give “an office or title of nobility or decoration, which
would clearly fall under the prohibition.” 123 Similarly, in 1964, the OLC
analyzed the purpose of the Domestic Emoluments Clause in answering
whether President Kennedy’s estate could receive naval retirement pay that
Kennedy earned while President. 124 The OLC explained the Domestic
Emoluments Clause “has to be interpreted in the light of its basic purposes
and principles,” which is “to prevent Congress or any of the states from attempting to influence the President through financial awards or penalties.” 125
In President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Retirement Benefits from the
State of California, 126 the OLC determined that President Reagan’s would
not violate the Domestic Emoluments Clause by receiving state retirement
benefits from the State of California. 127 In analyzing the Domestic Emoluments Clause, the OLC started with the text, describing the word emolument as “an archaic term” with two dictionary definitions. 128 Looking to
contemporary dictionaries, the Oxford English Dictionary defined an emolument as a “profit or gain arising from station, office, or employment: reward, remuneration, salary,” and gave the “obsolete meanings of advantage,
benefit, comfort.” 129 Next, the OLC analyzed the history and purpose of the
Clause, finding the Clause’s inclusion in the Constitution was motivated by
Hamilton’s writings on a fixed presidential salary in the Federalist No. 73,
and the incident where the King of France gave an extravagant snuff box to
Benjamin Franklin. 130 Based on historic data, the OLC determined an
emolument had to do with “payments which have a potential of influencing
or corrupting the integrity of the recipient.” 131 This interpretation is broader
122. Gifts from Foreign Prince–Officer–Constitutional Prohibition, 24 Op. Att’y Gen. 116,
117 (1902).
123. Id. at 118 (“[E]ven a simple remembrance of courtesy . . . falls under the inclusion of
‘any present . . . of any kind whatever.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8)). In this case, the
question was whether gifts of portraits from the Prince of Prussia to the Navy Department, the
Military Academy, and the Naval Academy would violate the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Id. at
117.
124. President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Ret. Benefits from the State of Ca., 5 Op. O.L.C.
187, 189 (1981) (citing Letter from Assistant Attorney Gen. Schler to Gen. Counsel Keller, Gen.
Accounting Office (Oct. 13, 1964)).
125. Id. at 189.
126. 5 Op. O.L.C. 187 (1981).
127. Id. at 190.
128. Id. at 188.
129. Id. at 188. The OLC noted that Webster’s Third New International Dictionary contained
similar definitions. Id.
130. Id.; see supra Section I.A.
131. 5 Op. O.L.C. at 188.
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than the office-related definition the Court used for other federal officers in
Hoyt, MacMillan, and McLean. 132 The OLC concluded Reagan’s retirement benefits from the State of California were not emoluments under the
Constitution because Reagan had “acquired a vested right” to those benefits
six years before he became President. 133 According to the OLC, the retirement benefits were not emoluments in the context of the Emoluments
Clauses because “such receipt does not violate the spirit of the Constitution
because they do not subject the President to any improper influence.” 134
Essentially, the OLC found that because the retirement benefits were not
gifts 135 and were fully vested, they did not have the potential to unduly influence or corrupt President Reagan. 136 The OLC’s opinion in the case of
Reagan’s retirement benefits is similar to the approach taken in earlier opinions, 137 where the OLC interpreted the purpose of the Clauses and asked
whether the benefit had the potential of corrupting or unduly influencing the
recipient. 138
In Application of the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution and the
Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act, 139 the OLC considered whether an employee of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who worked with the Mexican government could do short-term work with an American consulting
firm that received payments from the Mexican government. 140 The OLC
found the employee of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be in violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause if he received payments from an
American consulting firm for his services in connection with the construction of a power plant in Mexico if the Mexican government was the actual
source of payment. 141 The OLC reasoned the Mexican government had “ultimate control, including selection of personnel.” 142
In Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS, 143 the OLC found profits an Administrative Conference 144
132. See supra Section I.B.
133. 5 Op. O.L.C. at 191, 192.
134. Id. at 192.
135. Id. at 191.
136. Id. at 192.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 122–125.
138. 5 Op. O.L.C. at 192.
139. 6 Op. O.L.C. 156 (1982).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 158–59.
142. Id. at 158. The OLC suggested that the Emoluments Clauses were intended to have a
broad reach beyond diplomats and ambassadors: “Even though the Framers may have had the example of high officials such as ‘foreign Ministers’ in mind when discussing the clause . . . its policy would appear to be just as important as applied to subordinates.” Id.
143. 17 Op. O.L.C. 114 (1993).
144. The Administrative Conference is made up of no more than 100 members, including “a
Chairman appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, the chair-
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member earned through a partnership that included money the firm received
“from representing its foreign governmental clients” turned the partnership
into what “would in effect be a conduit for that [foreign] government.” 145
The OLC noted, “some portion of the member’s income could fairly be attributed to a foreign government,” and this income was not allowed under
the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 146 The 1993 OLC opinion interpreted
emoluments as encompassing more than gifts; emoluments could be any
payment or benefit received from a foreign government, including proceeds
from a partnership, if that money came from a foreign government. 147
In Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and
Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 148 the
OLC determined the Nobel Peace Prize, which the Nobel Committee
awards, was not an emolument under the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 149
The OLC determined the Nobel Committee was not a “King, Prince, or foreign State,” and the Nobel Committee did not have the kind of ties to foreign governments that would make it an instrumentality of a foreign
state. 150 The OLC described how going back to 1906, six federal officers
accepted the Nobel Peace Prize during the time they were in office without
the consent of Congress. 151 The OLC used this historical record as reinforcement that many acceptances of the Nobel Peace Prize were not in violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 152 “To be sure,” the OLC explained, “this long, unbroken practice of high federal officials accepting the
Nobel Peace Prize without congressional consent cannot dictate the outcome, . . . [b]ut we do think such practice strongly supports the conclusion
that the President’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize would not conflict with
the Emoluments Clause.” 153
The OLC opinions demonstrate that the Executive Branch operated
under the understanding that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to the
Office of the Presidency. 154 Moreover, the OLC construed the Emoluments
Clauses to encompass not just fees or gifts, but any payment or benefit from
a foreign government wherein the foreign government exerted control over

man . . .of each regulatory board or commission, the head . . . of each executive department or
other administrative agency which is designated by the President” among others. Id. at 115.
145. Id. at 119.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 33 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2009).
149. Id. at 1.
150. Id. at 6–7. In this case, the OLC did not find that a foreign government exerted control or
influence over the Nobel Peace Prize. Id. at 9.
151. Id. at 11.
152. Id. at 7.
153. Id. at 6.
154. See supra notes 124–125, 134, 149 and accompanying text.
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the payment or benefit 155 and that payment had the potential to unduly influence or corrupt the officer. 156
D. The Emoluments Clauses Litigation
In recent litigation, the meaning and application of the Foreign and
Domestic Emoluments Clauses is being put to the test, as for the first time,
the constitutional provisions are being applied to a sitting President. Three
separate lawsuits allege that President Trump’s interest in his hotels 157 poses Emoluments Clauses violations. In Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics
in Washington v. Trump 158 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York determined a government watchdog group and a restaurant employee association did not have standing to sue the President for
alleged Emoluments Clauses violations, and, therefore, the court did not
reach the merits on the emoluments issues. 159 In District of Columbia v.
Trump, however, the Maryland Federal District Court held the State of
Maryland and the District of Columbia had Article III and prudential standing to sue, they had stated a plausible claim, and the matter was not a political question. 160 In the third case, Blumenthal v. Trump, 161 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia held a group of Democratic
Congressmembers had standing to sue the President. 162
1. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump was the
first lawsuit filed on the emoluments issue. The plaintiffs—CREW, 163
ROC United, 164 Jill Phaneuf, 165 and Eric Goode 166—alleged Trump’s busi-

155. Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS, 17 Op.
O.L.C. 114, 119 (1993); Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8 (2009).
156. President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Ret. Benefits from the State of Cal., 5 Op. O.L.C.
187, 192; (1981); see supra note 131.
157. See supra notes 8–12, 17–28.
158. 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
159. Id. at 179. See infra Section I.D.1.
160. District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 756, 757 (D. Md. 2018); see infra
Section I.D.2.
161. 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018).
162. Id. at 64, 65.
163. CREW’s mission is to “protect[] the rights of citizens to be informed about the activities
of government officials, ensur[e] the integrity of government officials, protect[] [the] political system against corruption, and reduc[e] the influence of money in politics.” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 180.
164. ROC United is a nonprofit with nearly 25,000 restaurant employees. Id. at 180.
165. Phaneuf focuses on hospitality and plans embassy functions. Id.
166. Goode is the owner of several hotels, bars, restaurants, and event spaces in New York
City. Id.
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ness interests in New York City created conflicts of interest that violated
the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses. 167 They alleged that foreign diplomats frequented the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C.; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had bought property in the Trump Tower in New York
City “over the last two decades;” and the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China, a Chinese state-owned bank, was “one of the largest tenants of
Trump Tower” in New York City. 168 The plaintiffs also alleged the lease
that allowed the Trump Hotel to rent the Old Post Office Building, a federal
property, ran afoul of the Domestic Emoluments Clause. 169 Phaneuf and
Goode claimed the President’s continued stake in his hotel businesses, and
the business these hotels and restaurants received from foreign “governmental sources” was increasing competition and hurting Phaneuf and
Goode’s bottom line. 170 ROC United alleged its members suffered business
losses, as well 171 CREW’s stated injury for standing purposes was that it
suffered harm from having to allocate resources away from other potential
issues in order to fight for the emoluments issues. 172
The Federal District Court in the Southern District of New York found
the hospitality plaintiffs failed to show President Trump’s actions caused
their competitive injury, and the injury was not redressable in court. 173 The
court found it was “wholly speculative” whether their loss of business was
traceable to the President “or instead result[ed] from government officials’
independent desire to patronize [the] [d]efendant’s businesses.” 174 The
court did not view a competitive injury as falling within the “zone of interests” of the Foreign Emoluments Clause because “[n]othing in the text or
the history of the Emoluments Clauses suggests that the Framers intended
these provisions to protect anyone from competition.” 175 Rather, the court
stated the Framers intended the Clauses to protect government from “corruption and undue influence” 176 The court held that CREW’s claims should
be dismissed because the organization did not have an injury. 177

167. Id. at 179, 180.
168. Id. at 182.
169. Id. at 183.
170. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs claimed competitive injuries for standing purposes. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 185.
174. Id. at 186.
175. Id. at 187.
176. Id. In holding the hospitality plaintiffs’ competitive injury did not fall within the “zone
of interests” of the Emoluments Clauses, the court pointed out that increased competition could
happen even if Congress consented to the operation of the Trump hotels and restaurants, leaving
the plaintiffs with “no cognizable claim to redress in court.” Id. at 188.
177. Id.
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The court then turned to the political question doctrine. 178 The court
held that the case presented a non-justiciable political question and should
be left to Congress 179: “As the only political branch with the power to consent to violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, Congress is the appropriate body to determine whether, and to what extent, [the President’s]
conduct unlawfully infringes on that power.” 180 The court also decided the
claim was not yet ripe because it involved a conflict between two co-equal
branches of government that had not matured. 181 Currently, the case is under appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 182
2. District of Columbia v. Trump
In District of Columbia v. Trump, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland took a different approach towards standing and the
political question doctrine. 183 The Attorneys General for the District of Columbia and the State of Maryland filed a lawsuit on June 12, 2017, alleging
the President’s interests in the Trump Organization and the Trump Hotel in
Washington, D.C. harmed Washington D.C.’s and Maryland’s “sovereign,
quasi-sovereign, proprietary, and parens patriae interests.” 184
The Amended Complaint to the case claimed, in part, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia “spent thousands of dollars on rooms, catering, and parking”
at the Trump Hotel from January to February of 2017. 185 Also, according to
the Amended Complaint, the Trump Hotel allegedly marketed to diplomats
by hiring a “director of diplomatic sales” and holding “an event . . .
pitch[ing] the Hotel to about 100 foreign diplomats.” 186 A Middle-Eastern
diplomat reportedly told the Washington Post, “Believe me, all the delegations will go there,” and an Asian diplomat reportedly echoed that sentiment about the Trump Hotel saying, “Isn’t it rude to come to his city and
say, ‘I am staying at your competitor?’” 187 The Maryland Federal District
Court held Washington, D.C. and Maryland had standing to sue 188 with respect to the alleged Emoluments Clauses violations involving the Trump
Hotel in Washington, D.C. only, and had “sufficiently alleged that the President is violating the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses . . . by
178. Id. at 193.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 194.
182. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y.
2017), appeal filed, No. 18-474 (2d Cir. Feb. 16, 2018).
183. District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 757 (D. Md. 2018).
184. Id. at 732.
185. Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at 15–16.
186. Id. at 14.
187. Id. at 14–15.
188. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 757.
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reason of his involvement with and receipt of benefits from the Trump International Hotel . . . as well as the operations of the Trump Organization
with respect to the same.” 189
The State of Maryland alleged injuries to its sovereign interests because the Emoluments Clauses were “material inducements to its decision
to enter the Union.” 190 In other words, Maryland argued that it entered the
Union, in 1776, as a state in part because of the Clauses. 191 Next, Maryland
and the District of Columbia alleged injuries to their “quasi-sovereign interests” because they have an interest in enforcing their respective tax, zoning,
and land use laws. 192 The plaintiffs also claimed injuries to their proprietary interests. 193 The Walter E. Washington Convention Center, the Washington Convention Center and Sports Authority, and the Carnegie Library
“directly compete with the Hotel.” 194 Similarly, the Montgomery County
Conference Center in the Bethesda North Marriott Hotel and the MGM Hotel in the National Harbor in Oxen Hill, Maryland also compete with the
Trump Hotel for government business and patronage. 195 Washington, D.C.
and Maryland argued the Trump Hotel has “illegally skewed the hospitality
market in [President Trump’s] favor.” 196
Lastly, Washington, D.C and the State of Maryland claimed parens
patriae rights 197 to sue because companies and their employees lost opportunities to conduct business with diplomats due to competition from the
Trump Hotel. 198 The remedy Washington, D.C. and Maryland sought was
declaratory and injunctive relief. 199 While the court rejected the claim that
Maryland had suffered an injury to its sovereign interests, it agreed with
Washington, D.C. and Maryland that they had sufficiently alleged injuries

189. Id. at 757, 758.
190. Id. at 735.
191. Id.
192. Id. Washington, D.C. and Maryland claimed the President’s alleged receipt of emoluments from other states force the states to choose between granting exemptions or waivers to the
Trump Organization, such as tax reductions, for activities conducted in Maryland and Washington, D.C. and risk losing revenue, or denying the Trump Organization’s requests and risk being
placed at a disadvantage compared to other states that have agreed to grant concessions. Id. at 735
& n.7.
193. Id. at 735.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 735–36.
196. Id. at 736.
197. Parens patriae means “parent of the country.” Id. at 736 n.9 (citing Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex. rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982)). It refers to a state’s right as a
sovereign to sue as a guardian of its residents. Id.; see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520
(2007) (“Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign
interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”).
198. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 736.
199. Id. at 732.
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to their quasi-sovereign, proprietary, and parens patriae interests. 200 Washington, D.C. and Maryland had stated a plausible claim that Emoluments
Clauses violations had left them with an “inability to compete on an equal
footing” with the Trump Hotel’s operations in Washington, D.C. 201 This
alleged loss of competition established Article III standing regarding the
Trump Hotel. 202 These competitive injuries, the court found, could be plausibly traced to President Trump, considering the alleged statements from
foreign government officials, including one where an official said they
chose the Hotel because they wanted the President to know they “love [his]
new hotel.” 203 The court also found the injuries could be redressable
through appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief if the plaintiffs succeeded on the merits. 204
The court turned to prudential standing and concluded the language of
the Foreign Emoluments Clause was not a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.” 205 In
Baker v. Carr, 206 the Supreme Court listed several other factors for prudential standing, but the Maryland Federal District Court did not analyze those
factors in depth. 207 Instead, the Maryland Federal District Court leaped to
the political question doctrine, determining it is the court’s job to decide
“whether the President has acted within the law.” 208 Unlike in Citizens for
Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, where the court held the
case should be left for Congress to resolve under the political question doctrine, the court in District of Columbia v. Trump held the political question
doctrine did not apply. 209
For the first time, a federal court had reached the merits in interpreting
the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses in the Constitution and
needed to decide if the plaintiffs had stated a claim under the Clauses. 210
To interpret the Clauses, the court used an original public meaning and pur200. Id. at 752–53.
201. Id. at 743. The court explained, “plaintiffs with an economic interest have standing to
sue to prevent a direct competitor from receiving an illegal market benefit leading to an unlawful
increase in competition” when a plaintiff shows it is “sufficiently injured by the competition . . . to
create a case or controversy.” Id. at 744 (alteration in original) (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971)).
202. Id. at 742. The court found it much harder to believe there would be an “actual or imminent injury to either plaintiff . . . with respect to the decision of the State of Florida or any other
State to patronize the Trump Organization’s Mar-a-Lago” in Palm Beach. Id.
203. Id. at 749–50.
204. Id. at 752–53.
205. Id. at 756 (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012)).
206. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
207. Id. at 217.
208. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 757 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997)).
209. Id. at 756. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174,
193, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
210. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 878 (D. Md. 2018).
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posive approach. 211 It was a battle of the dictionary definitions. 212 Washington, D.C. and Maryland referenced dictionary definitions from the
Founding Era 213 and closely analyzed the word choice within the Foreign
Emoluments Clause, including the use of “any kind whatever” to modify
“Emolument.” 214 Washington, D.C. and Maryland argued there were two
definitions of emoluments at the time of the Founding. 215 The most common definition was that emoluments meant “profit,” “gain,” or “advantage.” 216 The second, less common, definition was “‘profit arising from
an office or employ’ with ‘employ’ defined as ‘a person’s trade, [or] business.’” 217 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) representing the President, in
his official capacity, used dictionary definitions from the Founding Era 218
that supported an office-related definition of an emolument as “a profit arising from an office or employ.” 219 The President argued that under that definition, the benefit “must be predicated on services rendered in an official
capacity or an employment (or equivalent) relationship and be given in exchange for the provision of a service in that relationship.” 220 For example,
an emolument would be a foreign government paying a federal official to
take certain official actions. 221
The court dismissed the argument that presidents do not hold an “Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States].” 222 The court found that a
broad interpretation of the meaning of the word emolument 223 fit because

211. Id. at 881. Both parties were in favor of this interpretive approach. Id.
212. Id. at 880.
213. Id.; Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at
31–33, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018), 315 F. Supp. 3d 875
(D. Md. 2018) (No. 18:17-cv-01596-PJM).
214. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 213, at 33.
215. Id. at 31–32.
216. Id. at 31 (first quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed., London 1785); and then quoting N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (20th ed., London 1763)).
217. Id. at 32 (alternation in original) (quoting BARCLAY, A COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON A NEW PLAN (n.p. 1774)). The second definition appeared in less than
eight percent of Founding Era dictionaries. Id. (citing John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolument” in English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806, at 1, 2 (July 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995693).
218. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 880; Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 32, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018), 315 F. Supp. 3d
875 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 8:17-cv-1596-PJM) (defining “emolument” as a “profit arising from an
office or employ” (quoting BARCLAY, supra note 217)).
219. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 880.
220. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 218, at 32.
221. Id. at 32–33 (“In either case, the benefit would be predicated on the official’s rendering
of services pursuant to an office or employment.”).
222. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 883.
223. Id. at 889 (“‘[P]rofit,’ ‘gain,’ or ‘advantage’ from any kind of exchange . . . .”).
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the narrower, office-related definition of emoluments would be equivalent
to “federal bribery,” which is an impeachable offense. 224 Federal bribery
involves a quid pro quo, where a public official, directly or indirectly, receives or accepts anything of value from someone in exchange for doing a
favor for them. 225 The court found it would be redundant to include Emoluments Clauses preventing presidents from accepting money from foreign
governments in exchange for official services when Article II, Section 4 of
the Constitution does the same. 226
Citing scholarship about the Framers’ anti-corruption purposes, the
Maryland Federal District Court determined the Framers “unquestionably”
adopted the Foreign Emoluments Clause because they were worried about
undue foreign influence. 227 Further, the court found the OLC opinions supported a definition of emoluments that encompassed the broader definition
of “any profits” from foreign governments. 228 The court defined emoluments broadly as “any profit, gain, or advantage, of more than de minimis
value, received by [the President], directly or indirectly, from foreign, the
federal, or domestic governments.” 229 Then, the court held the plaintiffs’
allegations plausibly stated a claim under the Foreign Emoluments Clause
because Trump had received, or potentially could receive, profits from foreign governments without the consent of Congress. 230 The court also held
the lease between President Trump and the GSA for the Trump Hotel in the
Old Post Office Building constituted an emolument in violation of the Domestic Emoluments Clause. 231 The DOJ on behalf of the President in his
official capacity filed an interlocutory appeal and a stay pending appeal of
the court’s decisions. 232
The Fourth Circuit granted the President’s petition for mandamus and
stayed the lawsuit in December 2018, holding oral argument in March

224. Id. The court cited McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), where the Governor of Virginia received cash and in-kind benefits from constituents, as demonstrating the difficulty of determining what constitutes an “official act sufficient to establish a criminal quid pro
quo.” Id. at 898 (citing McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372). The Court in McDonnell held that a
criminal quid pro quo required more than simply holding a meeting, speaking to another official,
or organizing an event. Id. (citing McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372).
225. Id. at 889 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (2012)).
226. Id. The U.S. Constitution provides, “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
227. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 896 (first citing Teachout, supra note 32, at 361; then citing
Sills, supra note 32, at 72; then citing James D. Savage, Corruption and Virtue at the Constitutional Convention, 56 J. Pol’y 174, 174–76, 181–82 (1994)).
228. Id. at 900; see supra Section I.C.
229. Id. at 904.
230. Id. at 905–06.
231. Id. at 906.
232. Id.
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2019. 233 During oral argument, a Fourth Circuit panel of three judges directed questions towards Maryland and Washington, D.C., including
whether a state could bring a suit against any other officer, such as a Secretary of State, for accepting an emolument 234 and exactly what type of injunctive relief Maryland and Washington, D.C. were requesting other than
divestment. 235 The Fourth Circuit panel was interested in whether Maryland and Washington, D.C. had stated a claim under the Emoluments
Clauses and whether anything other than divestment could satisfy their request for injunctive relief. 236
3. Blumenthal v. Trump
In Blumenthal v. Trump, 237 201 Democratic members of Congress
sued the President in his official capacity for allegedly violating the Foreign
Emoluments Clause. 238 As in District of Columbia v. Trump, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a stand-alone opinion addressing the threshold question of standing. 239 The court similarly
held the plaintiffs had standing. 240 The congressmembers alleged they suffered a concrete injury when the President denied them the opportunity to
vote on whether to approve his alleged receipt of emoluments. 241 The President argued the case was essentially a political spat between Congress and
the Executive Branch that did not belong in court because Congress could
convince a majority in both Houses to pass legislation about the emoluments issues. 242
The legislators stated Trump had not given Congress an opportunity to
consent to any foreign emoluments he had received. 243 Without the chance
to give or withhold consent, the congressmembers argued they could not
“force the President to comply with the Constitution absent a judicial order.” 244 The President argued plaintiffs could enact legislation on the
emoluments issue if they had the votes. 245
233. Dave Simpson, 4th Cir. Stays DC., Md. Emoluments Suit Against Trump, LAW360 (Dec.
20, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1113963/4th-circ-stays-dc-md-emoluments-suitagainst-trump.
234. Oral Argument at 10:12, Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875 (No. 18-2486),
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/18-2486-20190319.mp3.
235. Id. at 30:33.
236. Id.
237. 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D. D.C. 2018).
238. Id. at 50.
239. Id.; District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 732 (D. Md. 2018).
240. Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50; Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d. at 732.
241. Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 50.
242. Id. at 50–51.
243. Id. at 51.
244. Id. (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 63.
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The court found the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged an injury as members of Congress because the President had, in effect, nullified the Congress
members’ votes when he did not ask for Congress’s consent before allegedly accepting foreign emoluments. 246 The court held separations-of-powers
principles did not prevent the plaintiffs from having standing because
emoluments are prohibited without Congress’s consent, so it is up to the
President to ask for that consent, rather than the other way around. 247 Blumenthal v. Trump illustrated a different view on the possibility of a legislative remedy and the role of the courts in resolving the problem than Citizens
for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, which held the case
was not appropriate for judicial review under the political question doctrine
until Congress asserted its authority on the matter. 248
II. ANALYSIS
District of Columbia v. Trump marks the first time a federal court has
interpreted the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses and how they
apply to the President. This Comment argues the courts in the emoluments
litigation 249 and executive branch practice and precedent 250 correctly recognized the purpose of the Emoluments Clauses is to prevent corruption and
undue influence on federal officials. 251 Section II.A. analyzes the originalist and purposive approach to interpretation the parties in recent Emoluments Clause litigation have taken, and analyzes their use of Founding-Era
dictionaries to support a broad or narrow definition of an emolument. 252
Section II.B discusses how a living approach to interpretation would ask:
What are today’s emoluments and how have modern-day Presidents treated
potential conflicts of interests? 253 Section II.C. analyzes how a moral reading approach would view the Emoluments Clauses as embodying an abstract anti-corruption principle 254 and would allow for normative judgments
about how the Clauses should best be understood, independent of what the
Framers may have thought. 255 As the first case to reach the merits, these
Sections focus mostly on District of Columbia v. Trump.

246. Id. at 66.
247. Id. at 67.
248. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 193–94
(S.D.N.Y. 2017); see supra notes 178–181 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Section I.D.1–3.
250. See supra Section I.C.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 36.
252. See infra Section II.A.
253. See infra Section II.B.
254. See Teachout, supra note 32, at 342, 343.
255. See infra Section II.C.
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A. The Textualist and Originalist Approach to the Emoluments
Clauses
The parties in District of Columbia v. Trump took a textualist and
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.256 Central to plaintiffs
Washington, D.C. and Maryland’s argument is an originalist question at
heart: What did the Framers intend the Emoluments Clauses to mean? 257
1. Textualism
In order to interpret the Emoluments Clauses, courts start with the text
itself. 258 Under a textualist approach, when the text is unambiguous and
clear, “there is no room for construction” and courts should look to a word
or phrase’s ordinary meaning 259 In District of Columbia v. Trump, both
Washington, D.C., Maryland, and the DOJ lawyers representing the President analyzed the plain language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, using
Founding-Era dictionaries in order to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the
word emolument at the time of the Founding. 260 As Justice Scalia described
the philosophy of textualism, “A text . . . should be construed reasonably, to
contain all that it fairly means.” 261 The fact that both the plaintiffs and defendant closely examined the text of the constitutional provisions demonstrates how prevalent and mainstream the textualist approach is today. As
Professor Victoria Nourse points out, Justice Kagan said, “[W]e are all constitutional textualists and originalists now.” 262
Black’s Law Dictionary defines an emolument as “[a]ny advantage,
profit, or gain received as a result of one’s employment or one’s holding of
office.” 263 The word “emolument” in Webster’s Dictionary has two meanings: “the returns arising from office or employment usually in the form of

256. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 881 (D. Md. 2018) (“Both sides
embrace a blend of original public meaning and purposive analysis”).
257. EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.
258. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 881 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519
(1997)); see also United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731–32 (1931).
259. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731–32 (1931) (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. 304, 326 (1816)); see Martin, 14 U.S. at 326 (“The words are to be taken in their natural
and obvious sense, and not in a sense unreasonably restricted or enlarged.”).
260. See Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 886–887; supra Section I.C.
261. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 177, 178 (Michael J. Gerhardt et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).
262. See Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of
Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 n.3 (2018) (quoting Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia
Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, at 8:29, HARV. L. TODAY
(Nov. 25, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutoryinterpretation/); see also Coyle, supra note 34.
263. Emolument, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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compensation or prerequisites” and “advantage.” 264 Synonyms include:
“hire,” “pay,” “salary,” “stipend,” and “wage.” 265
The text of the Foreign Emoluments Clause contains no definition of
the word emoluments. Thus, using a textualist approach, the court in District of Columbia v. Trump reasonably interpreted the word emoluments to
give it its ordinary meaning and encompass all it could fairly mean. 266 Both
current and Founding-Era dictionary definitions provide support for a definition of emoluments as reaching any “profit,” “gain,” or “advantage.” 267
Moreover, there are numerous examples of the Framers using the word
emoluments as encompassing a general benefit during their debates. 268 In
support of an office-related definition of emoluments, President Trump argued, in the Domestic Emoluments Clause, the word compensation is next
to the words “for his services,” indicating that any provision with the word
emolument in it is impliedly qualified by the words “for his services.” 269
He argued that under the noscitur a sociis 270 rule of statutory construction, a
word should be read in context with the other words surrounding it in a
provision, such as the words “present,” “Office,” and “Title” in the Foreign
Emoluments Clause. 271 The President argued that interpreting emolument
to cover any profit, gain, or advantage would be redundant since the word
“present,” has its own distinct, relatively straightforward meaning as a
gift. 272
Professor Grewal argues the office-related definition is more consistent with the text of the Emoluments Clause. 273 According to Grewal,
“broad purposes may have animated the introduction and ratification of the
clause, but, for purposes of constitutional interpretation, the only relevant
264. Emolument,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/emolument (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
265. Id.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 260–261.
267. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 880 (D. Md. 2018).
268. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 62, at 24 (“The highest honors and emoluments of this
commonwealth are a poor compensation for the surrender of personal independence.”); id. at 36
(“[T]he conqueror will take care of his own emoluments, and have little concern for the interest of
the people.”); id. at 66 (“Cast your eyes to your seaports: see how commerce languishes. This
country, so blessed, by nature, with every advantage that can render commerce profitable, through
defective legislation is deprived of all the benefits and emoluments she might otherwise reap from
it.”); id. at 127 (“In other countries, where the fate of the poor is wretched, officers are created
merely for the emolument of certain individuals . . . .”).
269. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 887.
270. Noscitur a sociis is a Latin term meaning “it is known by the company it keeps” and is
“the concept that the intended meaning of an ambiguous word depends on the context in which it
is used.” What is NOSCITUR A SOCIIS, LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/noscitura-sociis/ (last visited June 20, 2019); see U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 8.
271. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 886–887.
272. Id. at 887.
273. Grewal, supra note 49, at 169.
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purpose is that embodied in the text itself.” 274 Even looking beyond the
purpose of the Clauses and just at the text itself, the Maryland Federal District Court reasonably found the expansive modifiers of “of any kind whatever” indicates the words in context with the other words in the Emoluments Clauses should be broadly construed. 275 Even though there are
narrower meanings of the word emolument in dictionary definitions today,
the word emolument was frequently used in contexts outside of the narrow,
office-related definition. 276 Moreover, the plain meaning of the text of the
Foreign Emoluments Clause does not expressly limit the Clause’s application to only civil officers and not the President. The Clause says, “no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust.” 277 Elected officials are not expressly excluded from the language of the Clause itself. 278 In reaching the
merits, the court in District of Columbia v. Trump construed the plain
meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause reasonably as having the
broader of the two possible dictionary definitions. 279
2. The Framers’ Intent
Both sides rely on arguments about the Framers’ intent at the time of
the Founding. 280 While both sides ultimately came to different conclusions
about the Framers’ intentions, neither the plaintiffs nor the President disputed that the Framers’ intentions were important, if not the most important,
piece of the emoluments puzzle. 281 The DOJ, representing the President in
the litigation, argued the Framers had no intention for the Foreign Emoluments Clause to encompass profits from foreign governments in part because Delegate Pinckney, the very same Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention who suggested adding the Foreign Emoluments Clause in the
first place,282 ran plantations in South Carolina while serving in public office. 283 Many of our earliest Presidents were plantation owners who ex274. Id. at 169.
275. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 887.
276. Id. at 877, 904; see supra note 268 and accompanying text.
277. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
278. See Nourse, supra note 262, at 26–27 (discussing how the term “unelected” is not expressly written in the Foreign Emoluments Clause, but scholars who argue the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply to the President infer that the word is there).
279. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 878–88.
280. Id. at 881; see, e.g., EISEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1.
281. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 220, at 40
(arguing the history and purpose of the Emoluments Clauses did not have to do with private commercial arrangements); see Memorandum in Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 213, at 34 (arguing the Clauses “reflects the Framers’ insight . . . that every
person is susceptible to being influenced . . . when receiving gifts, profits, offices, or titles”).
282. See supra note 51–53 and accompanying text.
283. Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 220, at 41 (arguing that at the time of the Founding, “government officials were not given generous compensa-
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ported their cash crops overseas. 284 At the time of the Founding, the DOJ
argued on behalf of the President, government officials were not always
paid well, so many federal officials worked for the government with the understanding they would be able to work and earn money outside of office. 285
The court in District of Columbia v. Trump correctly pushed back on this,
recognizing that the Emoluments Clauses does not ban all “private foreign
or domestic transactions,” but rather only transactions that occur with foreign governments or foreign government officials without Congress’s consent. 286 In other words, the Clauses do not prohibit federal officials from
running businesses; rather, they simply prohibit doing business with representatives of foreign governments without the consent of Congress.
The Framers did not want ambassadors to be put in the position of receiving opulent gifts from foreign governments because of the potential for
undue influence. 287 During the time of the Founding, Benjamin Franklin’s
grandson wrote Thomas Jefferson informing him of the tradition of ambassadors and diplomats in Europe receiving opulent gifts from heads of foreign states simply because the heads of the foreign states respected and
liked the ambassadors. 288 In the example of the gold snuff box Franklin received from the King of France, there is no indication that the gift was a
quid pro quo, where the gift was in exchange for services. 289 The Framers,
however, wanted to ban these kinds of gifts without the consent of Congress, because even the slightest appearance of corruption or undue foreign
influence on an American ambassador had the potential to “disturb[] that
confidence” and make it difficult, if not impossible, for people to know
whether a particular ambassador was beholden to a foreign country. 290
While the court in Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v.
Trump did not reach the merits on the emoluments issue, that court also determined the Framers intended the Clauses to prevent corruption. 291 The
tions,” and many federal officials in public office operated under the assumption that they could
still maintain their businesses ).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 899 (D. Md. 2018).
287. See Sills, supra note 32, at 73 (“In addition to actual corruption, [Governor] Randolph
recognized that the perception of undue influence from foreign states was as significant as actual
foreign influence itself.”); Teachout, supra note 30, at 38 (describing how Thomas Jefferson did
not enjoy accepting gifts while he was a diplomat in Europe, finding the tradition of exchanging
gifts to be “distasteful”).
288. See supra Section I.A.
289. Letter from William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson supra note 57; see Teachout,
supra note 30, at 35.
290. Cf. Teachout, supra note 30, at 34–35 (describing general disapproval of gifts in diplomacy during the Founders Era); see Sills, supra note 32, at 75 (describing how the Framers wanted to protect national security provisions through the emoluments provisions).
291. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 274 F. Supp. 3d 174, 186–87
(S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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court concluded the Clauses were included in the Constitution because of
“the Framers’ concern with protecting the new government from corruption
and undue influence.” 292 The Framers wanted to avoid even the appearance
of impropriety, which is why they banned the receiving of any emoluments
without the consent of Congress. 293
In applying an originalist approach in his scholarship on the emoluments issue, Professor Seth Barrett Tillman looks not only to what the
Framers’ intended, but what they actually did as proof of what the Clauses
should mean. 294 Tillman argues the Clauses do not apply to the President
and that the Framers did not intend to include profits and benefits received
in connection with business transactions for value. 295 Regarding the Domestic Emoluments Clause and the Trump Hotel’s location in the Old Post
Office Building, Tillman argues if the Framers intended to prevent Presidents from doing business with the U.S. government, there would have
been a problem with our first President George Washington doing business
with the federal government and buying several lots of land in Washington,
D.C. at a public auction. 296 One such purchase occurred in September
1793, during and auction run by three commissioners who had been involved in the ratification of the Constitution. 297 Tillman also describes how
the French government gave President Washington gifts twice.298 On December 22, 1791, the French ambassador to the United States wrote President Washington a letter asking if he could give the President a gift of a
new print of the King of France. 299 Washington said yes, replying in a letter “the new and elegant print of the King of the French, which you have
been so obliging as to send me this morning as a mark of your attachment to

292. Id. at 187.
293. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
294. See e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments” Problem, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 761 (2017) [hereinafter Tillman, Business
Transactions]; Tillman, supra note 49, at 188–89 (describing how President Washington received
gifts from French leaders); Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor
Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 399, 415 (2012) [hereinafter Tillman, Citizens United].
295. Tillman, Business Transactions, supra note 294, at 761.
296. Id. at 761–62; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (providing that while the President is in
office, they “shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or
any of them”).
297. Tillman, Business Transactions, supra note 294, at 761. The three commissioners that
ran the public auction, according to Professor Tillman, were David Stuart, a member of the Virginia Convention that ratified the Constitution, Daniel Carroll, who was a member of the Federal
Constitutional Convention, and Thomas Johnson, who was the first Governor of Maryland and
later became a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. Id. at 761–62.
298. Tillman, supra note 49, at 188–80 (describing how Washington received a key to the
Bastille from Lafayette and a portrait from King Louis XVI).
299. Tillman, Citizens United, supra note 294, at 415.
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my person.” 300 Professor Tillman argues that President Washington’s acceptance of the French gift without asking first for congressional consent
shows the Framers did not intend for the Foreign Emoluments Clause to
apply to the President. 301
Tillman takes the position that construing the emoluments Clauses
broadly to encompass profits or advantages and applying it to the President
“amounts to a naked assertion by twenty-first century legal academics that
they understand the Constitution’s binding legal meaning better than those
who drafted it, ratified it, and put it into effect during the Washington administration.” 302 The premise of the argument is Washington’s actions as
the first President should be dispositive of what the Framers intended the
Emoluments Clauses to mean at the time of the Founding, and by extension,
what they mean today. An originalist approach arguing what the Framers
actually did should be dispositive of what the Emoluments Clauses means
is limiting for many reasons, including that judges, and lawyers for that
matter, are (usually) not trained historians, nor should they be expected to
be. 303
The Supreme Court warned of the dangers of looking exclusively to
history and tradition to answer constitutional questions. 304 Justice Kennedy
discussed in Obergefell v. Hodges 305 how the Founders “did not presume to
know the extent of freedom in all its dimensions, and so they entrusted to
future generations a charter.” 306 If we were to take Washington’s actions as
dispositive of what the Emoluments Clauses means, or is intended to mean,
we would be limiting ourselves to a static understanding of the Constitution
that even the Framers may not have intended. 307

300. Id. at 416 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Ambassador Ternant (Dec. 22,
1791), in 9 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 306 (Mark A. Mastromarino & Jack D. Warren, Jr., eds., 2000)).
301. Id. at 17 (arguing that President Washington would not have perceived himself as being
an “Officer” in the context of the Foreign Emoluments Clause).
302. Tillman, Business Transaction, supra note 294, at 763.
303. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1085 (1989), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 261, at 211, 215 (“[The Framers’] shared common culture should be reflected in some
degree of consensus about the meaning of texts. Even where this is true, however, discerning that
consensus may require a deep knowledge of a historical period, which may be beyond the reach of
anyone but historians specializing in the period.”).
304. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (discussing how rights do not
come only from history and ancient sources).
305. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). The Court in Obergefell held that same-sex couples have the
right to marry under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 2604–05.
306. Id. at 2598.
307. See id.

2019]

INTERPRETING EMOLUMENTS TODAY

1029

3. An Original Public Meaning Approach
The original public meaning approach to constitutional interpretation
centers on what the voters originally understood the provisions to mean,
versus the actions or thoughts of the Framers. 308 Justice Scalia wrote he
consulted the writings of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, not
to glean how the delegates thought, but rather because their writings displayed how the text of the Constitution was originally understood. 309 This
approach considers the Constitution was written for the voters to understand. 310
Under an original public meaning perspective, the Maryland Federal
District Court in District of Columbia v. Trump correctly held that emoluments were understood at the time of the founding to mean any profit, gain
or advantage. 311 The President’s narrower definition of “emoluments” is
based in part on the early cases, such as, Hoyt v. United States, United
States v. MacMillan, and McLean v. United States, which defined emoluments as compensation and fees for the services of their office.312 Professor
Grewal describes an office-related definition of emoluments as the original
meaning of emoluments, stating that the relevant legal authority provides
“that emoluments under the Constitution refer to compensation received in
exchange for services provided as an officer or employee” rather than the
broader definition of profits, gains, or advantages from foreign governments. 313 Grewal also makes the point that at the time of the Founding, it is
possible that people believed only ambassadors would travel abroad extensively, so they were the ones especially susceptible to “improper foreign influences.” 314 Grewal argues that determining whether a foreign government
directly paid a federal officer in exchange for personal services or has indirectly paid a federal officer through payments to a business are factual differences that “must be examined closely.” 315
One problem with the office-related definition of emoluments is that it
would not include a scenario where a federal official received some sort of

308. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 261, at 233,
243, 244 (describing how the original public meaning approach “is focused less on the concrete
intentions of individual drafters of constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that
was adopted”).
309. SCALIA, supra note 261, at 179–80.
310. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 889 (D. Md. 2018) (quoting District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2007)).
311. Id. at 900; see Teachout, supra note 30, at 30; supra note 229.
312. See supra Section I.B.
313. Amandeep S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102
MINN. L. REV. 639, 692 (2017).
314. Id. at 646–47.
315. Id. at 692.
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benefit from a foreign government official even though they did not officially return a service. Receiving a benefit in those circumstances would
not necessarily rise to the same level as a quid pro quo, but it potentially
could be corrupting, because the official might feel placed in a similar position as the ambassador receiving an extravagant gift. 316 In support of a
broader definition of emoluments, 317 the Maryland Federal District Court
explained it is difficult for people to know whether a benefit has the potential to corrupt or not. 318 The court stated, when a President maintains a luxury hotel that generates profits while he is in office—even if those profits
go in a Trust—it creates the appearance of undue influence, which is
enough. 319 The court stated, “How, indeed, could it ever be proven, in a
given case, that he had actually been influenced by the payments? The
Framers of the Clauses made it simple. Ban the offerings altogether (unless,
in the foreign context at least, Congress sees fit to approve them).” 320 Because actual influence is so difficult to prove, preventing even the appearance of receiving an undue influence from foreign government officials in
the context of the Emoluments Clauses and without the consent of Congress
makes sense.
The Maryland Federal District Court in District of Columbia v. Trump
correctly held the reach of the Emoluments Clauses goes beyond quid pro
quo corruption in the Foreign Emoluments Clause 321 because the original
purpose of the Emoluments Clauses was to protect against both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption. 322 The court found this anticorruption interest covered more than a quid pro quo. 323 Based on the original
public meaning of the Emoluments Clauses, the court held the intent of the
provision was to prevent corruption and undue foreign influences, and went
“beyond simple payment for services rendered by a federal official in his
official capacity, which in effect would merely restate a prohibition against

316. See supra notes 64–68.
317. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 898 (D. Md. 2018).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.; see also Teachout, supra note 32, at 380 (describing how the Framers tried to put
structures and conditions in place to minimize corruption).
321. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 895 (discussing the practical difficulties of narrowly construing the Clauses because “any requirement that a quid pro quo for official services has been established would be easy to circumvent while at the same time difficult to prove”); McCutcheon v.
FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014) (defining quid pro quo as a Latin phrase capturing the notion of “a
direct exchange of an official act for money” or “dollars for political favors”); Sills, supra note 32,
at 63–64 (discussing how classical republican ideals, including concerns that corruption and greed
could destroy a nation, played an important role in the formation of the country); see supra Section II.A.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 287–290.
323. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 898; see also Zephyr Teachout, Love, Equality, and Corruption, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 454 (2015).

2019]

INTERPRETING EMOLUMENTS TODAY

1031

bribery.” 324 The text of the Clause lends supports to this reading because it
includes the modifiers of “any kind whatever,” indicating the purpose of the
Clause is to prevent a wide breadth of emoluments.325
The expansive modifier in the Foreign Emoluments Clause is significant because in the context of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has been hesitant to find an anti-corruption purpose in the Constitution beyond quid pro quo corruption. In First Amendment campaign finance cases, the Court held the government’s anti-corruption interest only
covered quid pro quo corruption. 326 One important distinguishing factor,
however, is the plain language of the Foreign Emoluments Clause lends itself to being broadly construed to encompass influences beyond quid pro
quo corruption, since the provision expressly prevents officials from accepting gifts and presents, which are arguably less corrupting than a bribe. 327
Under an original public meaning approach, the court interpreted the Emoluments Clauses as anti-corruption provisions whose original meaning goes
beyond payments for services rendered. 328
4. A Purposive Approach
The court in District of Columbia v. Trump also took a purposive approach to interpretation, giving substantial weight to executive branch precedent and practice over the decades through the OLC opinions. 329 A purposive approach treats historical practice “as an important interpretive
factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when the practice began after the [F]ounding [E]ra.” 330
Blumenthal v. Trump took a purposive approach in describing how previous
presidents acted under the assumption that they had to follow the Foreign
Emoluments Clause. 331 For example, when the Republic of Colombia presented President Andrew Jackson with a gold medal, Jackson placed it “at

324. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 900.
325. Id. at 887–88.
326. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (holding that limits on campaign advertising expenditures “have a chilling effect” on speech “extending beyond the Government’s
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption”); McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 209 (“The line between
quid pro quo corruption and general influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must
be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights.”).
327. See supra notes 322–325 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
329. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 900; see supra Section I.C.
330. NLRB. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014). In NLRB. v. Noel Canning, Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, “put significant weight upon historical practice” since the
time of the Founding in interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Id. at
2559.
331. Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2018).
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the disposal of Congress.” 332 When the King of Siam gave President Abraham Lincoln gifts, Lincoln notified Congress, and they “deposited [the
gifts] in the collection of curiosities at the Department of Interior.” 333 Presidents have consistently turned to the OLC for legal advice about all matters, including whether they could constitutionally accept gifts from foreign
government officials. 334 President John F. Kennedy asked the OLC whether it would be constitutional to accept an “honorary Irish citizenship.” 335
The OLC determined under the “spirit of the provision,” President Kennedy
should get the consent of Congress in order to accept the honorary title. 336
As discussed in Section I.C., President Barack Obama turned to the OLC to
provide guidance on whether accepting the Nobel Peace Prize would be accepting a prohibited emolument. 337
OLC opinions demonstrate that previous administrations operated under the assumption that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to the President. 338 The OLC under previous administrations, both Republican and
Democrat, looked to the purpose of the Clauses to decide whether the benefit received from a foreign official had the potential to unduly influence or
corrupt the recipient, 339 and this is the approach the court took in District of
Columbia v. Trump. 340 On one hand, the retirement pension President

332. Id. (quoting Brief of Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs at 24, Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (No. 17-1154 (EGS))).
333. Id. (quoting Brief of Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Law Scholars, supra note
332, at 25).
334. Id. at 53–54; see supra Section I.C.
335. See Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 54 (citing Proposal that the President Accept Honorary Irish Citizenship, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 278, 279 (1963)).
336. Proposal that the President Accept Honorary Irish Citizenship, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 278,
279, 281 (1963).
337. Id.; see Section I.C.
338. See Amicus Brief of Former Government Ethics Officials Don Fox, et al. at 12, District
of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 18-2488) (recognizing that executive branch precedent considers an official’s business interests with a foreign government to be an
emolument when it “plausibly create[s] a conduit for improper payments and influence”); supra
Section I.C.
339. See Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act
to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (2009) (finding that even
though the Nobel Peace Prize was an emolument, the President would not run afoul of the Foreign
Emoluments Clause by accepting it because the Nobel Committee was not a foreign government);
Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS, 17 Op. O.L.C.
114, 1119 (1993) (discussing whether a member of ACUS receiving income from a partnership
where a foreign government could be providing some of the money violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause); Application of the Emoluments Clause of the Constitution and the Foreign Gifts
and Decorations Act, 6 Op. O.L.C. 156, 158 (1982) (discussing whether the source of payment to
an NRC employee is from a foreign State or an intermediary); President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Ret. Benefits from the State of Cal., 5 Op. O.L.C. 187, 192 (1981) (discussing whether state
retirement benefits subjected President Reagan to undue influence under the Domestic Emoluments Clause).
340. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 900 (D. Md. 2018).
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Reagan received as Governor of California was fully vested before Reagan
became President, so the OLC determined the benefit lacked the potential to
influence his decision-making. 341 On the other hand, the OLC found money
a partner received from a partnership, where the partnership was a mere
“conduit” for a foreign government, had the potential to influence the member and would constitute an emolument because some portion of the member’s income could be attributed to a foreign government. 342 The OLC
opinions, while not binding precedent, are useful guidance, 343 and courts in
the emoluments litigation correctly gave them weight in their analysis of the
Emoluments Clauses. 344
B. A Living Approach to Interpreting the Emoluments Clauses
In District of Columbia v. Trump, both the DOJ representing President
Trump and Washington, D.C. and Maryland interpreted the Constitution
with an original public meaning and purposive analysis approach. 345 In
fact, the court expressly pointed out that neither side “lock[ed] horns” over
constitutional interpretation at all. 346 One road not yet taken by anyone in
the emoluments litigation is a living constitution approach. Is it possible to
derive meaning in the twenty-first century from a word that is rarely, if ever, used today, without looking exclusively to the past? 347 Justice Brennan
described the logic of the living constitution approach:
Current Justices read the Constitution in the only way we can:
as twentieth-century Americans. . . . [T]he ultimate question
must be: What do the words of the text mean in our time? For the
genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability
of its great principles to cope with current problems and current
needs. 348
Perhaps the most famous proponent of the living constitution approach
was Chief Justice John Marshall who wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland, 349

341. See supra text accompanying notes 133–136.
342. Applicability of the Emoluments Clause to Non-Government Members of ACUS, 17 Op.
O.L.C. 114, 119 (1993).
343. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
344. But see Grewal, supra note 49, at 170–78 (arguing courts should take a textual approach
and not a purposive one because a textual approach is more consistent with legal authorities).
345. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 881.
346. Id.
347. Peter Overby, Federal Lawsuit Against President Trump’s Business Interests Allowed to
Proceed, NPR (July 25, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/25/632300960/federal-lawsuitagainst-president-trumps-business-interests-allowed-to-proceed.
348. Farber, supra note 303, at 222 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the
United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L.J. 433, 438 (1986)).
349. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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“This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” 350 Under a living approach, the Emoluments Clauses should not be
viewed as dusty provisions frozen in time during the Founding Era and not
intended to be applied to modern day circumstances. For Justice Marshall,
the Constitution was fundamental and permanent. 351 Similarly, in Brown v.
Board of Education, 352 Chief Justice Warren famously rejected taking a
strictly historical view to interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn back the clock
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present place
in American life throughout the Nation. 353
Using a living approach, the Brown Court interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment through the modern lens of the importance of education in
1954, rather than what people at the time of the Founding would have
thought of education. 354 Similarly, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 355 Justice Jackson wrote in his concurring opinion
that understanding what the Framers intended had they known modern conditions “must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams
Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.” 356
The value of the living constitution approach is that it allows judges to
flexibly apply the meaning of the Emoluments Clauses to modern circumstances. As Professor Grewal points out, “[The Constitution] must be applied to facts not envisioned by the Framers or the ratifying states.” 357 A
living approach may seem at odds with an originalist approach, but it need
not be. According to Professor Kermit Roosevelt, the appropriate living
“inquiry” decides whether the relevant constitutional provision’s words and

350. Id. at 415. Professor Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. references this quotation from McCulloch v.
Maryland in his scholarship. Eugene W. Hickock, Jr., The Birth of the “Living” Constitution, 14
COLONIAL LAW. 6, 6 (1985).
351. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 326 (1816) (describing how the Constitution was
intended to last: “The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few
years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the
inscrutable purposes of Providence”); see Hickok, Jr., supra note 350, at 6, 7 (describing how the
Framers recognized a need to allow for change in society, but also saw a need to adhere to permanent principles provided in a written Constitution).
352. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
353. Id. at 492–93.
354. Id.
355. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952).
356. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
357. Grewal, supra note 313, at 692.
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purpose are “better served by a static or flexible range of applications.” 358
For example, based on the way provisions like the Equal Protection Clause
and the Fourth Amendment were written, the Founders arguably intended
for them to be flexibly applied, while their meanings stayed constant. 359
The question, then, is whether the Emoluments Clauses’ purpose is better
served by a “fixed or flexible range of applications.” 360 The courts do not
disagree that the Clauses’ purpose was to prevent corruption. 361 Since the
words of the Emoluments Clauses do not limit its application to particular
issues, and use the expansive modifiers of “any kind whatever,” 362 it makes
sense to assume the Framers intended the Clauses to have a flexible application to prevent corruption, rather than a fixed one. 363
A flexible application of the Emoluments Clauses would recognize,
since Watergate, Presidents have taken steps on their own to avoid even the
appearance of impropriety, by consulting the OLC for advisory opinions
about whether something is an emolument, 364 or divesting their assets. 365
Since the 1970s, every President placed their assets in a trust administered
by an independent trustee. 366 The main conflicts of interest statute for government officials, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 367 which was enacted in the wake of Watergate, 368 does not require government officials to
shed assets; instead, it requires them to recuse themselves from working on
policies that conflict with those holdings. 369
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 did not extend a recusal requirement to the President because of separation of powers concerns.370
Despite being formally excluded from coverage under the law, scholar
358. Kermit Roosevelt, Originalism and the Living Constitution: Reconciliation, 1 ADVANCE
57, 60 (2007).
359. Id. at 61.
360. Id. at 62.
361. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; supra Section I.A.
362. See supra text accompanying note 275.
363. See Roosevelt, supra note 358, at 62; see also Brief of Former National Security Official
as Amicus Curiae at 9, 21, In re Trump, No. 18-2486 (4th Cir. 2019, Feb. 13, 2019) (describing
how the Framers wrote a Foreign Emoluments Clause that is sweeping in scope, and only a reading of the Clause that encompasses private dealings with foreign governments can adequately protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests in the modern era).
364. See supra Section I.C.
365. DANIEL I. WEINER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., STRENGTHENING PRESIDENTIAL ETHICS
LAWS
1
(2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Strengthening%20Presidential%20
Ethics%20Law.%20Daniel%20Weiner.pdf.
366. Id.
367. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
368. Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2219 (2018).
369. WEINER, supra note 365, at 1.
370. Renan, supra note 368, at 2219 (discussing how “the Ethics in Government Act did not
extend the statutory requirements . . . to the President, and subsequent legislation would expressly
exclude the President and Vice President from . . . coverage”).
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Daphne Renan explains, “[T]he conflict-of-interest norm, under which Presidents conduct themselves as if bound by the formal prohibitions, became
further institutionalized and regularized as a result of the Ethics in Government Act’s passage.” 371 The Office of Government Ethics (“OGE”) has advised officials over the years to divest their assets, and it has since become
routine to do so, according to Walter Shaub, the former head of the OGE. 372
While the President is subject to some disclosure rules under the Federal
Ethics in Government Act, “loopholes in those rules make it comparatively
easy to avoid full disclosure of assets, sources of income, and debts that
could impact official decision-making.” 373
The Trump Administration expressed ambivalence about the divestment norm. For example, John Bolton, current National Security Advisor,
told the Hamilton Society it is “harder to get things done” in part because of
the “excessive nature of the so-called ethics checks,” which he believes is
discouraging people from taking government jobs. 374 President Trump is
unique because of his wide variety of business interests 375 that make it more
difficult for him to divest. An ethics advisor to The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, Bobby R. Burchfield, stated, “liquidation or divestiture would
not make sense” in the President’s case because his “holdings are extensive
and diversified throughout the world.” 376 According to Burchfield, divesting would “be a fire sale with a potentially draconian loss of value.” 377 In
arguing the Trust is not that unusual, Burchfield stated President Jimmy
Carter put his peanut farm holdings in a trust, with his lawyer as trustee. 378
The difference, however, is that President Trump’s sons manage his Trust
and inform him periodically about how it is doing. 379 It is difficult to argue
that the Trust is truly a blind trust when Trump’s own family members are
managing it day to day rather than an independent trustee. 380 The lack of a
buffer between the President’s sons running the Trust and the President
371. Id.
372. Ryan Lizza, How Trump Broke the Office of Government Ethics, NEW YORKER (July 14,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ryan-lizza/how-trump-broke-the-office-of-governmentethics; see Renan, supra note 368, at 2190 (discussing the importance of norms of presidential
behavior).
373. WEINER, supra note 365, at 1.
374. Michael Burke, Bolton: “Excessive Nature of the So-Called Ethics Checks” Discourages
(Nov.
1,
2018),
People
from
Joining
Government,
HILL
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/414249-bolton-excessive-nature-of-the-so-calledethics-checks-discourages.
375. See infra notes 376–377 and accompanying text.
376. Bobby R. Burchfield, Ethics in the Executive Branch: The Constitutional, Statutory, and
Ethical Issue Faced by the Ethics Advisor to a President Holding Immense Wealth, 22 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 265, 274 (2018).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 276–77.
379. MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER, supra note 9.
380. See id.; see also WEINER, supra note 365, at 1.
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himself indicates a greater potential for Trump, through the Trust, to receive
a profit, gain, or advantage from the Trump Hotel’s alleged catering to foreign government officials.381
Ultimately, the Emoluments Clause question is not whether divesting
is easy or difficult. Consistent with the OLC interpretations from Democrat
and Republican administrations, the question should be whether profits,
benefits or advantages received from foreign government entities is an undue influence, or has the appearance of being an undue influence, necessitating the consent of Congress. 382 Under a living approach, the Emoluments Clauses would take into account the Clauses’ purposes to prevent
corruption and undue influence 383 and apply them to the modern day, where
for many decades, Presidents have divested to avoid even the appearance of
conflicts of interest. 384
C. A Moral Reading of the Foreign Emoluments Clause
This Section considers how a moral reading of the Clauses allows
courts to consider the abstract, moral dimension of the Clauses’ purpose.
Ronald Dworkin, the leading constitutional theorist for a moral reading of
the Constitution, explains many of the Clauses in the Constitution “are
drafted in exceedingly abstract moral language.” 385 The question of interpretation, or “translation” is to try and find language of our own that best
captures the Framers’ intent. 386
History helps us understand if there is a moral principle embedded in
the constitutional provision, or if the provision is a straightforward one, like
the Third Amendment, 387 which insists government may not quarter soldiers in citizens’ house in peacetime. 388 According to Dworkin, one could
381. See supra notes 228–230.
382. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 889 (D. Md. 2018) (“How, indeed,
could it ever be proven, in a given case, that he had actually been influenced by the payments?”
The Framers of the Clauses made it simple. Ban the offerings altogether [unless Congress consents to an official receiving them]”); see supra Section I.C.
383. Trump, 315. F. Supp. 3d at 896 (finding the historical record reflects an “intention that
the Emoluments Clauses function as broad anti-corruption provisions”); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding that based on
the history, “there can be no doubt” the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s purpose “was to prevent
official corruption and foreign influence”); Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 53 (D.D.C.
2018) (“The Clause was intended by the Framers to guard against corruption and foreign influence.”); see infra Section II.A.
384. See supra notes 364–366.
385. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 261, at 182, 186.
386. Id.
387. U.S. CONST. amend III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”).
388. DWORKIN, supra note 385, at 186.
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read into the Third Amendment and glean a principle from it, but it would
not make a lot of sense since it is clear what the plain language of the Third
Amendment means regarding soldiers in citizens’ houses during peacetime. 389 The same reasoning leads to a different result for the Equal Protection Clause, however, because the phrase “equal protection of the laws”
means something more—it is a deep statement that describes a general
principle of equality under the law. 390 Similarly, history shows the Framers
were concerned about corruption and undue foreign influence, and their
concern was one of the reasons the Emoluments Clauses were enacted.391
The word “emoluments” is also relatively ambiguous since it had two
meanings at the time of the Founding, and the word was not defined in the
Constitution. 392
A moral reasoning approach is not unfettered to the text or history.
Two restraints limit the scope of a moral reasoning approach. 393 First, what
the Framers’ intended matters. 394 Second, constitutional interpretation “is
disciplined under the moral reading by the requirement of constitutional integrity. . . . Judges may not read their own convictions into the Constitution.” 395 According to Dworkin:
The moral reading asks [judges] to find the best conception of
constitutional moral principles . . . that fits the broad story of
America’s historical record. It does not ask them to follow the
whisperings of their own consciences or the traditions of their
own class or sect if these cannot be seen as embedded in that record. 396
In other words, applying a moral reading approach, a judge would find
a conception of an anti-corruption principle that “fits” America’s history. 397
The moral reading approach sees the words of the Constitution as being tied
to history but also having “abstractions.” 398 Scholar Jack M. Balkin describes how lawyers use history to make legal arguments: “[W]henever
lawyers use history to show purpose, they are implicitly making an argu-

389. Id. at 186–87.
390. Id. at 187.
391. See Teachout, supra note 30, at 54 (“[W]e should give the principle and purpose of the
Constitution’s anti-corruption principle real weight in deciding close cases.”); Sills, supra note 32,
at 75 (“Influenced by the classical republican principle that corrupt influences from foreign states
could destroy a nation, the Framers incorporated the Emoluments Clauses into the Constitution”);
supra Section I.A.
392. See supra notes 212–221 and accompanying text; supra Section I.D.2.
393. DWORKIN, supra note 385, at 187.
394. Id. at 187–88.
395. Id. at 188.
396. Id.
397. See supra Section I.A.
398. DWORKIN, supra note 385, at 201, 203.

2019]

INTERPRETING EMOLUMENTS TODAY

1039

ment that the best reading of a text is one that fulfills the purposes of the
statute or constitutional provision, and this claim, in turn, presupposes a
theory of how laws should be applied.” 399 In other words, “the acceptable
forms of legal argument” are justified by “the moral and political ideas that
underwrite them.” 400 Critics of this approach say it allows judges to have
too much unfettered say over the law. 401 But really the process of unpacking an “anti-corruption principle” in the Clauses is not unmoored to the text
and purpose of the Constitution, even as originalists understand it. 402
The notion of corruption has an independent, moral component to it. 403
Corruption has two definitions in Black’s Law Dictionary: “an impairment
of integrity, virtue, or moral principle, esp. the impairment of a public official’s duties by bribery” and “[a] fiduciary’s or official’s use of a station or
office to procure some benefit either personally or for someone else.” 404
Professor Teachout argues that corruption goes even further and has “a
moral sense” with the “deep core of corruption involv[ing] personal, moral
failure.” 405 Ms. Sills argued the Framers intended for the Emoluments
Clauses “to guard against corruption in order to preserve and protect our
young Republic and its institutions from ruin.” 406 In The Anti-Corruption
Principle, Professor Teachout makes the point that “an anti-corruption principle” is embedded within the Constitution, 407 however, not all scholars ascribe to his view. 408

399. Jack M. Balkin, History, Rights, and the Moral Reading, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1425, 1439
(2016).
400. Id.
401. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on
Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 261, 199, 200
(critiquing the moral reading approach as leading to a situation where, “[t]he ‘best reading’ is the
reading that, in the judge’s own opinion, will produce the best answers, defined philosophically
and not historically”).
402. See President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Ret. Benefits from the State of Ca., 5 Op.
O.L.C. 187, 192 (1980). Explaining that state retirement benefits did not have the potential to corrupt President Reagan because they were fully vested, and so did not “violate the spirit of the
Constitution because they do not subject the President to any improper influence.” Id.; see also
supra note 49; supra Section II.A.4.
403. See Teachout, supra note 323, at 453.
404. Corruption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
405. Teachout, supra note 323, at 453.
406. Sills, supra note 32, at 72.
407. Teachout, supra note 32, at 342. But see Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the
Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. L. REV. 399, 404 (2012) (arguing “the Framers were not ‘obsessed’ with corruption” and the scope of the anti-corruption principle is limited to federal appointed officials, not elected officials).
408. See Martin H. Redish & Elana Nightingale Dawson, Worse Than the Disease: The AntiCorruption Principle, Free Expression, and the Democratic Process, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1053, 1056, 1057 (2012) (arguing that the anti-corruption principle would have the effect of
limiting free speech and expression and that the Constitution does not provide for a sweeping pro-
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A key to a charge of corruption, according to Professor Teachout, is
intent and motive. 409 Under a moral reading approach, however, Professor
Teachout’s take on the Clauses’ purpose goes too far. The plain language
of the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not have an intent element. The
Framers did not probe the intent of Benjamin Franklin when he accepted
the gold snuff box from the King of France. 410 Instead, as the court in District of Columbia v. Trump correctly recognized, emoluments were
“ban[ned] . . . all together” without the consent of Congress because they
have the potential to corrupt and unduly influence the recipient. 411 In other
words, gifts and emoluments were banned because they simply might look
bad, not because of who was giving or receiving the gift.
The Framers understood people are not perfect, and the checks and
balances built into our system of government through the Constitution represents the Framers’ brilliance in building a foundation that could cope with
the “moral failings of normal humans, instead of one that could only be
managed by angels.” 412 Accepting a gift or an emolument is likely to influence the person on the receiving end. 413 Rather than examining the intent
of the person giving the emolument, or the effect accepting an emolument
from a foreign governmental entity has on an official, the correct inquiry, in
accordance with the principle behind the Emoluments Clauses, is whether
receiving the emolument from the foreign governmental entity has the potential to corrupt. 414 In that case, the official should ask Congress for permission to accept the emolument. 415 A moral reading approach respects the
history and context of the Clauses’ inclusion in the Constitution 416 and recognizes a moral dimension to prevent corruption. The Clauses should be
construed broadly in asking whether receiving an emolument from a foreign
entity without the consent of Congress violates the moral spirit of the
Clause.
III. CONCLUSION
Recent emoluments litigation presents interesting questions of constitutional interpretation, as federal courts are faced with the task of interpreting two provisions that have been dormant since the Founding Era. This
hibition of corruption); Tillman, supra note 407, at 404 (arguing “the Framers were not ‘obsessed’
with corruption” and the scope of the anti-corruption principle does not reach elected officials).
409. Teachout, supra note 323, at 454 (describing how “corruption requires talking about
questions of motive, intent, feeling, and passion”).
410. See supra note 67–70.
411. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 898 (D. Md. 2018).
412. Teachout, supra note 32, at 379, 380.
413. See supra text accompanying note 68–69.
414. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 898.
415. See supra notes 230, 290.
416. See supra Section I.A.
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Comment argues the United States District Court for the District of Maryland correctly interpreted the word emoluments in the Emoluments Clauses
as any profit, gain, or advantage based on the plain language of the Clauses
and an originalist 417 approach to interpretation. 418 Moreover, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the Maryland
Federal District Court, and the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia faced with the Emoluments Clauses litigation correctly looked
to an anti-corruption purpose motivating the provisions. 419 This Comment
analyzes three methods of constitutional interpretation—originalism, living
constitution, and a moral reading approach—and puts forth the idea courts
could find an anti-corruption purpose motivating the Emoluments Clauses
using all three approaches. 420 Even for provisions that have lain dormant
for centuries, a living constitution approach could help inform an understanding, not only about what the Emoluments Clauses meant at the time of
the founding, but what they mean today. 421 Moreover, a moral reading of
the Emoluments Clauses could account for the Clauses’ anti-corruption
purpose, and consider whether receiving an emolument “violate[s] the spirit” of that purpose. 422

417. See supra Section II.A.
418. See supra Section I.A.4.
419. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315. F. Supp. 3d 875, 896 (D. Md. 2018) (finding the historical record reflects an “intention that the Emoluments Clauses function as broad anti-corruption
provisions”); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 188
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding that based on the history, “there can be no doubt” the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s purpose was to prevent official corruption and foreign influence”); Blumenthal v.
Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The Clause was intended by the Framers to guard
against corruption and foreign influence.”); see supra Section II.A.3.
420. See supra Section II.A.
421. See supra Section II.B.
422. President Reagan’s Ability to Receive Ret. Benefits from the State of Cal., 5 Op. O.L.C.
187, 188, 191, 192 (1981); see supra Section II.C.

